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## Off

#### Interpretation – economic engagement must be one of the following economic contacts

**Resnick 1** (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301>)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS •Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations •Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes •Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS •Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa •Arms transfers •Military aid and cooperation •Military exchange and training programs •Confidence and security-building measures •Intelligence sharing **ECONOMIC CONTACTS •Trade agreements and promotion •Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants** CULTURAL CONTACTS •Cultural treaties •Inauguration of travel and tourism links •Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

#### Violation – ceding land is not engagement – it’s appeasement

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A more refined definition of appeasement that not only remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also **establishes a firm conceptual distinction from engagement** might be: the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by **ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence** to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US-acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine-permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border between Alaska and the Yukon--consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority.(n32) Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938); acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).(n33) A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again off-again diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--**engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement.** In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. **Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.**

## Off

#### Debt compromise likely now

Cohen et al, 10/10

Tom Cohen, CNN reporter, AND Dana Bash, AND Deirdre Walsh; “House Republicans meeting with Obama called 'very useful',” 10/10/2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/10/politics/shutdown-showdown> //bghs-ms

Washington (CNN) -- So is an end in sight?¶ House Speaker John Boehner -- the top Republican in the fight that's led to a government shutdown and the threat of a first-ever U.S. debt default -- left the White House on Thursday evening without commenting on a highly anticipated meeting with President Barack Obama.¶ But his top deputy, Majority Leader Eric Cantor, described the session between Obama and House leaders as "a very useful meeting."¶ "We're going to have more discussions on both sides tonight," the Virginia Republican said.¶ What that means, exactly, remains to be seen.¶ But the White House said in a statement that no specific determination was made at the meeting during which it said Obama and other top administration officials listened to Republican proposals and discussed "potential paths forward."¶ Obama "looks forward to making continued progress" on resolving the fiscal stalemate and key goals include ensuring "we pay the bills we've incurred" and ending the government shutdown, the statement said.¶ The weeks leading up to October 1 partial shutdown -- and ahead of the October 17 deadline at which point, the Treasury Department says, the government will run out of money to pay its bills unless the debt ceiling is raised -- have been marked by often heated, bitterly partisan debate.¶ Yet the very fact Obama and House Republicans got together, and the two sides are talking, could easily be seen as progress.¶ "We're all working together now," said Rep. Pete Sessions, a Texas Republican.¶ Earlier Thursday, House Republican leaders said they will propose a temporary increase in the nation's borrowing limit -- a potential first step toward breaking a political deadlock that has shut down parts of the government and now threatens a U.S. default as soon as next week.¶ However, the proposal outlined by Boehner would allow a partial government shutdown to continue while Republicans and Democrats negotiate broader budget and spending issues, as well as GOP demands to dismantle or delay Obamacare.¶ After meeting with his GOP caucus, Boehner described the offer as a temporary increase in the debt ceiling in exchange for Obama's "willingness to sit down and discuss with us a way forward to reopen the government and to start to deal with America's pressing problems."¶ The measure, which could come up for a vote as soon as Friday, would allow the government to continue borrowing money to pay its bills through mid-November.¶ Rep. Harold Rogers, a Kentucky Republican, said the president didn't reject this offer during Thursday's meeting -- nor did he say that he accepted it.¶ Without an increase in the debt ceiling, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew says the United States risked default as soon as October 17, an outcome that economists label as potentially catastrophic.¶ At the White House, spokesman Jay Carney said Obama was "happy that cooler heads at least seem to be prevailing in the House" over the need to avoid a possible default

#### Legislative requirements to closing Guantanamo means it will require a huge amount of Obama’s political capital

Huffington Post, 5-8-13

[Newstex, “Guantanamo’s Collapse,” Lexis, accessed 7-6-13 UR]

Fixing Guantanamo -- which is what Obama clearly wants --- will require him to take risky unilateral action and dedicate a great deal of political capital.

First, Obama will need to stick his neck out by restarting the transfer process under the national security waiver provisions in current law. If he believes that the stain of Guantanamo is truly harming our national security, and the risk of sending some detainees abroad is not too severe, then duty requires him to approve some transfers. To do this, he will also need some help from allies in the Middle East or elsewhere that have facilities that can handle these individuals and programs that might make resettlement a legitimate option. If the Administration is unwilling to take the political heat for authorizing transfers, then it has to admit that it no longer intends to even attempt to close Guantanamo.

Second, the Administration needs to clearly state where it intends to incarcerate those detainees who are either convicted in military commissions or will be held indefinitely under the law of war. Closing Guantanamo will be beneficial, because it would eliminate having a concentrated mass of detainees in one place, where they can take joint action and focus the attention of the world. Building a new detention facility for all of the same people in the United States will achieve nothing, as it will quickly be labeled Guantanamo North and cause all the same problems we have currently with Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Instead, we could disburse the population to other detention facilities, including military jails and super-max prisons in the United States where the detainees will be isolated and quietly reach old age over the next decades . The so-called blind sheik - Omar Abdel-Rahman - who was convicted of conspiring to bomb multiple sites in New York City, is serving a life sentence in a medium security medical prison in anonymity less than 25 miles from my office. Who knew?

Finally, we need to come to terms with creating a solid legal framework for the extremely rare cases when dangerous individuals are captured, but for a variety of reasons, cannot be tried in our criminal justice system or military commissions. There are many proposals for how this could be accomplished in a constitutional manner, but it will require hard bipartisan legislative work and a de-politicization of the detainee issue. It is hard to see how this might occur in our current political posture, but perhaps this would be a worthy project after the 2014 elections for a lame duck president and members of Congress who recognize that our current terrorist detention system is both unsustainable and damaging to our national security.

#### Political capital is key --- independently, taking Obama off message undermines his pressure strategy

Milbank, 9/27/13 – Washington Post Opinion Writer (Dana, “Obama should pivot to Dubya’s playbook” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-obama-should-try-pivoting-to-george-bushs-playbook/2013/09/27/c72469f0-278a-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9_story.html>)

If President Obama can stick to his guns, he will win his October standoff with Republicans. That’s an awfully big “if.” This president has been consistently inconsistent, predictably unpredictable and reliably erratic. Consider the events of Thursday morning: Obama gave a rousing speech in suburban Washington, in defense of Obamacare, on the eve of its implementation. “We’re now only five days away from finishing the job,” he told the crowd. But before he had even left the room, his administration let slip that it was delaying by a month the sign-up for the health-care exchanges for small businesses. It wasn’t a huge deal, but it was enough to trample on the message the president had just delivered. Throughout his presidency, Obama has had great difficulty delivering a consistent message. Supporters plead for him to take a position — any position — and stick with it. His shifting policy on confronting Syria was the most prominent of his vacillations, but his allies have seen a similar approach to the Guantanamo Bay prison, counterterrorism and climate change. Even on issues such as gun control and immigration where his views have been consistent, Obama has been inconsistent in promoting his message. Allies are reluctant to take risky stands, because they fear that Obama will change his mind and leave them standing alone. Now come the budget showdowns, which could define the rest of his presidency. Republican leaders are trying to shift the party’s emphasis from the fight over a government shutdown to the fight over the debt-limit increase, where they have more support. A new Bloomberg poll found that Americans, by a 2-to-1 margin, disagree with Obama’s view that Congress should raise the debt limit without any conditions. But Obama has a path to victory. That poll also found that Americans think lawmakers should stop trying to repeal Obamacare. And that was before House Republicans dramatically overplayed their hand by suggesting that they’ll allow the nation to default if Obama doesn’t agree to their laundry list of demands, including suspending Obamacare, repealing banking reforms, building a new oil pipeline, easing environmental regulations, limiting malpractice lawsuits and restricting access to Medicare. To beat the Republicans, Obama might follow the example of a Republican, George W. Bush. Whatever you think of what he did, he knew how to get it done: by simplifying his message and repeating it, ad nauseam, until he got the result he was after. Obama instead tends to give a speech and move along to the next topic. This is why he is forever making “pivots” back to the economy, or to health care. But the way to pressure Congress is to be President One Note. In the debt-limit fight, Obama already has his note: He will not negotiate over the full faith and credit of the United States. That’s as good a theme as any; it matters less what the message is than that he delivers it consistently. The idea, White House officials explained to me, is to avoid getting into a back-and-forth over taxes, spending and entitlement programs. “We’re right on the merits, but I don’t think we want to argue on the merits,” one said. “Our argument is not that our argument is better than theirs; it’s that theirs is stupid.” This is a clean message: Republicans are threatening to tank the economy — through a shutdown or, more likely, through a default on the debt — and Obama isn’t going to negotiate with these hostage-takers. Happily for Obama, Republicans are helping him to make the case by being publicly belligerent. After this week’s 21-hour speech on the Senate floor by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), the publicity-seeking Texan and Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) objected to a bipartisan request to move a vote from Friday to Thursday to give House Republicans more time to craft legislation avoiding a shutdown. On the Senate floor, Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) accused them of objecting because they had sent out e-mails encouraging their supporters to tune in to the vote on Friday. The Post’s Ed O’Keefe caught Cruz “appearing to snicker” as his colleague spoke — more smug teenager than legislator. Even if his opponents are making things easier for him, Obama still needs to stick to his message. As in Syria, the president has drawn a “red line” by saying he won’t negotiate with those who would put the United States into default. If he retreats, he will embolden his opponents and demoralize his supporters.

#### Going over the debt ceiling causes economic collapse

Krugman, 9/29

Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize winning economist; “Rebels Without a Clue,” 9/29/2013, New York Times,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/opinion/krugman-rebels-without-a-clue.html>

¶ Still, a government shutdown looks benign compared with the possibility that Congress might refuse to raise the debt ceiling.¶ First of all, hitting the ceiling would force a huge, immediate spending cut, almost surely pushing America back into recession. Beyond that, failure to raise the ceiling would mean missed payments on existing U.S. government debt. And that might have terrifying consequences.¶ Why? Financial markets have long treated U.S. bonds as the ultimate safe asset; the assumption that America will always honor its debts is the bedrock on which the world financial system rests. In particular, Treasury bills — short-term U.S. bonds — are what investors demand when they want absolutely solid collateral against loans. Treasury bills are so essential for this role that in times of severe stress they sometimes pay slightly negative interest rates — that is, they’re treated as being better than cash.¶ Now suppose it became clear that U.S. bonds weren’t safe, that America couldn’t be counted on to honor its debts after all. Suddenly, the whole system would be disrupted. Maybe, if we were lucky, financial institutions would quickly cobble together alternative arrangements. But it looks quite possible that default would create a huge financial crisis, dwarfing the crisis set off by the failure of Lehman Brothers five years ago.

#### Economic growth solves great power war and decline causes it

Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay Khalilzhad, Bush’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the UN and former director policy planning at the DOD; “The Economy and National Security”, National Review, 2-8-11, <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad>)

Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep [financial crisis](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad), not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual [interest payments](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial [tax increases](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. [debt problem](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today. The policy question is how to enhance [economic growth](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?pg=2) and employment while cutting discretionary spending in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering individual and corporate rates). These are promising options. The key remaining question is whether the president and leaders of both parties on Capitol Hill have the will to act and the skill to fashion bipartisan solutions. Whether we take the needed actions is a choice, however difficult it might be. It is clearly within our capacity to put our economy on a better trajectory. In garnering political support for cutbacks, the president and members of Congress should point not only to the domestic consequences of inaction — but also to the geopolitical implications. As the United States gets its economic and fiscal house in order, it should take steps to prevent a flare-up in Asia. The United States can do so by signaling that its domestic challenges will not impede its intentions to check Chinese expansionism. This can be done in cost-efficient ways. While China’s economic rise enables its military modernization and international assertiveness, it also frightens rival powers. The Obama administration has wisely moved to strengthen relations with allies and potential partners in the region but more can be done. Some Chinese policies encourage other parties to join with the United States, and the U.S. should not let these opportunities pass. China’s military assertiveness should enable security cooperation with countries on China’s periphery — particularly Japan, India, and Vietnam — in ways that complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus. China’s mercantilist policies and currency manipulation — which harm developing states both in East Asia and elsewhere — should be used to fashion a coalition in favor of a more balanced trade system. Since Beijing’s over-the-top reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese democracy activist alienated European leaders, highlighting human-rights questions would not only draw supporters from nearby countries but also embolden reformers within China. Since the end of the Cold War, a stable economic and financial condition at home has enabled America to have an expansive role in the world. Today we can no longer take this for granted. Unless we get our economic house in order, there is a risk that domestic stagnation in combination with the rise of rival powers will undermine our ability to deal with growing international problems. Regional hegemons in Asia could seize the moment, leading the world toward a new, dangerous era of multi-polarity.

## Off

#### Terror rhetoric creates a perpetual state of fear permeating our lives that remakes the public sphere, placing dissent as the enemy

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The war on terror has been as much a war against the American people, therefore, as a war against Arabs and Muslims (American or otherwise) and anyone else the U.S. ruling elite—which includes Democrats with Repub- licans—perceives as an enemy. The specter of terrorist enemies abroad, all apparently out to get ‘‘us,’’ magniﬁes the threat back home, and the newly formed Department of Homeland Security starts to warn ‘‘yellow,’’ shouts ‘‘orange,’’ screams ‘‘RED!’’ The intensiﬁcation of fear at home accentuates the threat abroad, which remagniﬁes the fear at home. An ontological sense of terror infects daily life as patriots are insidiously enticed to spy on those around them: ‘‘If you see something say something,’’ reads a post-9/11 public notice on the New York subway. The synergy between war abroad and the war at home remakes the public sphere; that which was once grotesque now fades away as a bland back- ground. This is true not just of U.S. criminality in Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and Guantánamo or British atrocities in Basra, but also of public discourse at home. Right-wing radio shows have dominated the airwaves with outra- geous demands for U.S. belligerence in search of imperial dominance, justi- ﬁed as an American birthright. Racism buttresses hatred, which buttresses racism, and so on. To choose just one of many examples, the talk show Imus in the Morning is habitually and viciously anti-Arab, once demeaning Arabs as ‘‘goat-humping weasels.’’ The Imus show celebrated Yasser Arafat’s death by calling Palestinians ‘‘stinking animals,’’ then advocated that the United States ‘‘drop the bomb and kill everybody’’ in Palestine. This was no unguarded comment; it was a serious statement on the MSNBC news network. Several weeks later, Vice President Dick Cheney appeared on the Imus show to publicize the possibility of an attack on Iran (by the United States or Israel), which he called ‘‘a noted sponsor of terror’’ and ‘‘top of the list’’ of future trouble spots. As Antonio Gramsci once noted in a rather dif- ferent context, one can predict the future to the extent one is involved in making it happen.11

#### Disorder and insecurity are inevitable – the affirmative’s fear-based politics upholds the extermination of difference in the name of certainty and ends in global destruction – the alternative is to vote negative to reject the 1ac and refuse the these authoritarian practices – you should position yourself as a critical intellectual interrogating security

Der Derian 98 (James Der Derian, professor of international studies at the Watson Institute, professor of political science at Brown University, director of the Watson Institute’s Global Security Program, Visiting Scholar at University of Southern California, Visiting Scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, Visiting Scholar at Oxford University, Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, M. Phil and D. Phil in International Relations from Oxford University, recipient of the Bosch Berlin Prize in Public Policy, Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin, 1998, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” can be found in “Critical Practices of International Theory: Selected Essays,” which was published in 2009, <http://www.gendocs.ru/docs/32/31660/conv_1/file1.pdf>)

The rapidity of change in the international system, as well as the inability of international theory to make sense of that change, raises this question: Of what value is security? More speciﬁcally, just how secure is this preeminent concept of international relations? This evaluation of security invokes interpretive strategies to ask epistemological, ontological, and political questions – questions that all too often are ignored, subordinated, or displaced by the technically biased, narrowly framed question of what it takes to achieve security. The goal, then, of this inquiry is to make philosophically problematic that which has been practically axiomatic in international relations. The ﬁrst step is to ask whether the paramount value of security lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of all values. No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People – and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it – the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically deﬁned and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything – transportation, capital and information ﬂows, change itself–have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said – that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing – “The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability.” 2 One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conﬂict, ranging from latino small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT (“Reemergent Global Threat”). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite. There are also prodromal efforts to shore up the center of the International Relations discipline. In a newly instituted series in the International Studies Quarterly, the state of security studies is surveyed so as to refortify its borders. 3 After acknowledging that “the boundaries of intellectual disciplines are permeable,” the author proceeds not only to raise the drawbridge but also to caulk every chink in the moat. 4 Recent attempts to broaden the concept of “security” to include such issues as global environmental dangers, disease, and economic and natural disasters endanger the ﬁeld by threatening “to destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difﬁcult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.” 5 The ﬁeld is surveyed in the most narrow and parochial way: out of 200-plus works cited, esteemed Third World scholars of strategic studies receive no mention, British and French scholars receive short shrift, and Soviet writers do not make it into the Pantheon at all. The author of the essay, Stephen Walt, has written one of the better books on alliance systems; 6 here he seems intent on constructing a new alliance within the discipline against “foreign” others, with the “postmodernist” as arch-alien. The tactic is familiar: like many of the neoconservatives who have launched the recent attacks on “political correctness,” the “liberals” of international relations make it a habit to base their criticisms on secondary accounts of a category of thinking rather than on a primary engagement with the speciﬁc (and often differing) views of the thinkers themselves.7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

## Case

### Terror

**Al-Qaeda is dead – attacks fail and ideology dead**

**Bergen 12** (Peter Bergen, CNN national security analyst, is the author of "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden, From 9/11 to Abbottabad.", 6/6/2012, "And now, only one senior al Qaeda leader left", edition.cnn.com/2012/06/05/opinion/bergen-al-qaeda-whos-left/index.html)

Washington (CNN) -- The news that Abu Yahya al-Libi, the No.2 leader of al Qaeda, is now confirmed to have been killed in a CIA drone strike in Pakistan's tribal region along the border with Afghanistan further underlines that **the terrorist group that launched the 9/11 attacks is now more or less out of business**. Under President Barack Obama, CIA drone strikes have killed 15 of the most important players in al Qaeda, according to a count maintained by the New America Foundation (a nonpartisan think tank where I am a director). Similarly, President George W. Bush also authorized drone strikes that killed 16 important al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan while he was in office. As a result, according to senior U.S. counterterrorism officials, there now remains only one leader of any consequence in al Qaeda and that is Ayman al-Zawahiri, the tetchy Egyptian surgeon who became the head of the group following the death of its founder, Osama bin Laden, in a U.S. Navy SEAL raid in Pakistan in May 2011. Zawahiri, presumably, is keenly aware of the fate of so many of his longtime colleagues in al Qaeda. He will be expending considerable energy not to end up on the business end of a missile fired by a CIA drone if he, too, is hiding in the Pakistani tribal regions where the drone strikes have been concentrated. Meanwhile, Zawahiri faces an almost impossible task to follow through on al Qaeda's main mission: attacking the United States, or failing that, one of its close allies. Al Qaeda hasn't conducted a successful attack in the West since the bombings on London's transportation system on July 7, 2005, and of course, the group hasn't succeeded in attacking the United States for more than a decade. There are, however, al Qaeda's regional affiliates still to contend with. The most virulent of those is the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. It was AQAP that tried to bring down Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 using a Nigerian recruit who had secreted a hard-to-detect bomb in his underwear, and it was AQAP that smuggled bombs in printer cartridges onto cargo planes bound for the U.S. in October 2010. Last month came news that a spy had penetrated AQAP and had retrieved a new generation of underwear bomb that the group's bomb maker had apparently recently designed to bring down a commercial jet. But **all of AQAP's plots to bring down planes have had one thing in common: They failed**. Some might say that that while al Qaeda the organization may be basically dead, its ideology continues to thrive and to inspire "lone wolves" to attack the United States. In fact, lone wolves inspired by jihadist ideology have managed to kill a total of 17 Americans in the United States since 9/11, according to a tally maintained by the New America Foundation. Meanwhile, 54 Americans are reported to be killed every year by lightning, according to the National Weather Service. In other words, to the average American, **lightning is about 30 times more deadly than jihadist terrorism**. Few Americans harbor irrational fears about being killed by a lightning bolt. Abu Yahya al-Libi's death on Monday should remind them that **fear of al Qaeda in its present state is** even more **irrational**.

**No threat – weak leadership and no recent attacks**

**Zenko and Cohen 12**, \*Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, \*Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.

Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.

According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

**No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant**

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that **none exist**. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

**Terrorists aren’t pursuing nukes**

**Wolfe 12 –** Alan Wolfe is Professor of Political Science at Boston College. He is also a Senior Fellow with the World Policy Institute at the New School University in New York. A contributing editor of The New Republic, The Wilson Quarterly, Commonwealth Magazine, and In Character, Professor Wolfe writes often for those publications as well as for Commonweal, The New York Times, Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, The Washington Post, and other magazines and newspapers. March 27, 2012, "Fixated by “Nuclear Terror” or Just Paranoia?" [http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-“nuclear-terror”-or-just-paranoia-2/](http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-)

If one were to read the most recent unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions, it does have a section on CBRN terrorism (note, not WMD terrorism). The intelligence community has a very toned down statement that says “several terrorist groups … probably remain interested in [CBRN] capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. … mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and toxins.” They’re talking about terrorists getting industrial chemicals and making ricin toxin, not nuclear weapons. And yes, Ms. Squassoni, it is primarily al Qaeda that the U.S. government worries about, no one else. The trend of worldwide terrorism continues to remain in the realm of conventional attacks. In 2010, there were more than 11,500 terrorist attacks, affecting about 50,000 victims including almost 13,200 deaths. None of them were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009, none were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,800 terrorist attacks in 2008, none were caused by CBRN hazards.

### Relations

**The global climate is cooling and warming isn’t anthropogenic**

**Easterbrook, 8** (Don Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University. Bellingham, WA; “Global Cooling is Here: Evidence for Predicting Global Cooling for the Next Three Decades,” 11/2/2008, http://www.globalresearch.ca/global-cooling-is-here/) [Images omitted]

Despite no global warming in 10 years and recording setting cold in 2007-2008, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC) and computer modelers who believe that CO2 is the cause of global warming still predict the Earth is in store for catastrophic warming in this century. IPCC computer models have predicted global warming of 1° F per decade and 5-6° C (10-11° F) by 2100 (Fig. 1), which would cause global catastrophe with ramifications for human life, natural habitat, energy and water resources, and food production. All of this is predicated on the assumption that global warming is caused by increasing atmospheric CO2 and that CO2 will continue to rise rapidly. Figure 1. A. IPCC prediction of global warming early in the 21st century. B. IPCC prediction of global warming to 2100. (Sources: IPCC website) However, records of past climate changes suggest an altogether different scenario for the 21st century. Rather than drastic global warming at a rate of 0.5 ° C (1° F) per decade, historic records of past natural cycles suggest global cooling for the first several decades of the 21st century to about 2030, followed by global warming from about 2030 to about 2060, and renewed global cooling from 2060 to 2090 (Easterbrook, D.J., 2005, 2006a, b, 2007, 2008a, b); Easterbrook and Kovanen, 2000, 2001). Climatic fluctuations over the past several hundred years suggest ~30 year climatic cycles of global warming and cooling, on a general rising trend from the Little Ice Age. PREDICTIONS BASED ON PAST CLIMATE PATTERNS Global climate changes have been far more intense (12 to 20 times as intense in some cases) than the global warming of the past century, and they took place in as little as 20–100 years. Global warming of the past century (0.8° C) is virtually insignificant when compared to the magnitude of at least 10 global climate changes in the past 15,000 years. None of these sudden global climate changes could possibly have been caused by human CO2 input to the atmosphere because they all took place long before anthropogenic CO2 emissions began. The cause of the ten earlier ‘natural’ climate changes was most likely the same as the cause of global warming from 1977 to 1998. Figure 2. Climate changes in the past 17,000 years from the GISP2 Greenland ice core. Red = warming, blue = cooling. (Modified from Cuffy and Clow, 1997) Climatic fluctuations over the past several hundred years suggest ~30 year climatic cycles of global warming and cooling (Figure 3) on a generally rising trend from the Little Ice Age about 500 years ago. Figure 3. Alternating warm and cool cycles since 1470 AD. Blue = cool, red = warm. Based on oxygen isotope ratios from the GISP2 Greenland ice core. Relationships between glacial fluctuations, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, and global climate change. After several decades of studying alpine glacier fluctuations in the North Cascade Range, my research showed a distinct pattern of glacial advances and retreats (the Glacial Decadal Oscillation, GDO) that correlated well with climate records. In 1992, Mantua published the Pacific Decadal Oscillation curve showing warming and cooling of the Pacific Ocean that correlated remarkably well with glacial fluctuations. Both the GDA and the PDO matched global temperature records and were obviously related (Fig. 4). All but the latest 30 years of changes occurred prior to significant CO2 emissions so they were clearly unrelated to atmospheric CO2. Figure 4. Correspondence of the GDO, PDO, and global temperature variations. The significance of the correlation between the GDO, PDO, and global temperature is that once this connection has been made, climatic changes during the past century can be understood, and the pattern of glacial and climatic fluctuations over the past millennia can be reconstructed. These patterns can then be used to project climatic changes in the future. Using the pattern established for the past several hundred years, in 1998 I projected the temperature curve for the past century into the next century and came up with curve ‘A’ in Figure 5 as an approximation of what might be in store for the world if the pattern of past climate changes continued. Ironically, that prediction was made in the warmest year of the past three decades and at the acme of the 1977-1998 warm period. At that time, the projected curved indicated global cooling beginning about 2005 ± 3-5 years until about 2030, then renewed warming from about 2030 to about 2060 (unrelated to CO2—just continuation of the natural cycle), then another cool period from about 2060 to about 2090. This was admittedly an approximation, but it was radically different from the 1° F per decade warming called for by the IPCC. Because the prediction was so different from the IPCC prediction, time would obviously show which projection was ultimately correct. Now a decade later, the global climate has not warmed 1° F as forecast by the IPCC but has cooled slightly until 2007-08 when global temperatures turned sharply downward. In 2008, NASA satellite imagery (Figure 6) confirmed that the Pacific Ocean had switched from the warm mode it had been in since 1977 to its cool mode, similar to that of the 1945-1977 global cooling period. The shift strongly suggests that **the next several decades will be cooler, not warmer as predicted by the IPCC**. Figure 5. Global temperature projection for the coming century, based on warming/cooling cycles of the past several centuries. ‘A’ projection based on assuming next cool phase will be similar to the 1945-1977 cool phase. ‘B’ projection based on assuming next cool phase will be similar to the 1880-1915 cool phase. The predicted warm cycle from 2030 to 2060 is based on projection of the 1977 to 1998 warm phase and the cooling phase from 2060 to 2090 is based on projection of the 1945 to 1977 cool cycle. Implications of PDO, NAO, GDO, and sun spot cycles for global climate in coming decades The IPCC prediction of global temperatures, 1° F warmer by 2011 and 2° F by 2038 (Fig. 1), stand little chance of being correct. NASA’s imagery showing that the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) has shifted to its cool phase is right on schedule as predicted by past climate and PDO changes (Easterbrook, 2001, 2006, 2007). The PDO typically lasts 25-30 years and assures North America of cool, wetter climates during its cool phases and warmer, drier climates during its warm phases. The establishment of the cool PDO, together with similar cooling of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), virtually assures several decades of global cooling and the end of the past 30-year warm phase. It also means that the IPCC predictions of catastrophic global warming this century were highly inaccurate. The switch of PDO cool mode to warm mode in 1977 initiated several decades of global warming. The PDO has now switched from its warm mode (where it had been since 1977) into its cool mode. As shown on the graph above, each time this had happened in the past century, global temperature has followed. The upper map shows cool ocean temperatures in blue (note the North American west coast). The lower diagram shows how the PDO has switched back and forth from warm to cool modes in the past century, each time causing global temperature to follow. Comparisons of historic global climate warming and cooling over the past century with PDO and NAO oscillations, glacial fluctuations, and sun spot activity show strong correlations and provide a solid data base for future climate change projections. The Pacific Ocean has a warm temperature mode and a cool temperature mode, and in the past century, has switched back forth between these two modes every 25-30 years (known as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation or PDO). In 1977 the Pacific abruptly shifted from its cool mode (where it had been since about 1945) into its warm mode, and this initiated global warming from 1977 to 1998. The correlation between the PDO and global climate is well established. The announcement by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory that the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) had shifted to its cool phase is right on schedule as predicted by past climate and PDO changes (Easterbrook, 2001, 2006, 2007). The PDO typically lasts 25-30 years and assures North America of cool, wetter climates during its cool phases and warmer, drier climates during its warm phases. The establishment of the cool PDO, together with similar cooling of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), virtually assures several decades of global cooling and the end of the past 30-year warm phase. Comparisons of historic global climate warming and cooling over the past century with PDO and NAO oscillations, glacial fluctuations, and sun spot activity show strong correlations and provide a solid data base for future climate change projections. As shown by the historic pattern of GDOs and PDOs over the past century and by corresponding global warming and cooling, the pattern is part of ongoing warm/cool cycles that last 25-30 years. The global cooling phase from 1880 to 1910, characterized by advance of glaciers worldwide, was followed by a shift to the warm-phase PDO for 30 years, global warming and rapid glacier recession. The cool-phase PDO returned in ~1945 accompanied by global cooling and glacial advance for 30 years. Shift to the warm-phase PDO in 1977 initiated global warming and recession of glaciers that persisted until 1998. Recent establishment of the PDO cool phase appeared right on target and assuming that its effect will be similar to past history, global climates can be expected to cool over the next 25-30 years. The global warming of this century is exactly in phase with the normal climatic pattern of cyclic warming and cooling and we have now switched from a warm phase to a cool phase right at the predicted time (Fig. 5).

**Doesn’t cause extinction**

**NIPCC, 11** (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change; “Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC,” 3/8/2011, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html)

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

**Warming’s not real – the Earth has been cooling for decades**

Ferrara 12 [Peter, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis. Served in the White House Office of Policy Development, and as Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States, Graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School, 5/23/2012, “Sorry Global Warming Alarmists, The Earth Is Cooling”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/] DHirsch

Climate change itself is already in the process of definitively rebutting climate alarmists who think human use of fossil fuels is causing ultimately catastrophic global warming. That is because natural climate cycles have already turned from warming to cooling, global temperatures have already been declining for more than 10 years, and global temperatures will continue to decline for another two decades or more. That is one of the most interesting conclusions to come out of the seventh International Climate Change Conference sponsored by the Heartland Institute, held last week in Chicago. I attended, and served as one of the speakers, talking about The Economic Implications of High Cost Energy. The conference featured serious natural science, contrary to the self-interested *political science* you hear from government financed global warming alarmists seeking to justify widely expanded regulatory and taxation powers for government bodies, or government body wannabees, such as the United Nations. See for yourself, as the conference speeches are [online](http://climateconferences.heartland.org/iccc7/). What you will see are calm, dispassionate presentations by serious, pedigreed scientists discussing and explaining reams of data. In sharp contrast to these climate realists, the climate alarmists have long admitted that they cannot defend their theory that humans are causing catastrophic global warming in public debate. With the conference presentations online, let’s see if the alarmists really do have any response. The Heartland Institute has effectively become the international headquarters of the climate realists, an analog to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has achieved that status through these international climate conferences, and the publication of its *Climate Change Reconsidered* volumes, produced in conjunction with the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). Those *Climate Change Reconsidered* volumes are an equivalently thorough scientific rebuttal to the irregular Assessment Reports of the UN’s IPCC. You can ask any advocate of human caused catastrophic global warming what their response is to *Climate Change Reconsidered*. If they have none, they are not qualified to discuss the issue intelligently. Check out the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming (and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally caused climate cycles. For example, temperatures dropped steadily from the late 1940s to the late 1970s. The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due around now. In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late 1990s, a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage. The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures.

**Agricultural crises are creating global food shortages – that kills a billion people – increased CO2 is key to solve**

Idso’s, 11 [Sherwood PhD and former research physicist for the Department of Agriculture, Keith PhD Botany, Craig PhD Geography, 6/6/2011, “Meeting the Food Needs of a Growing World Population”, http://www.co2science.org/articles/V14/N27/EDIT.php] DHirsch

Parry and Hawkesford (2010) introduce their study of the global problem by noting that "food production needs to increase 50% by 2030 and double by 2050 to meet projected demands," and they note that at the same time the demand for food is increasing, production is progressively being limited by "non-food uses of crops and cropland," such as the production of biofuels, stating that in their homeland of the UK, "by 2015 more than a quarter of wheat grain may be destined for bioenergy production," which surely must strike one as both sad and strange, when they also note that "currently, at least one billion people are chronically malnourished and the situation is deteriorating," with more people "hungrier now than at the start of the millennium." So what to do about it: that is the question the two researchers broach in their review of the sad situation. They begin by describing the all-important process of photosynthesis, by which the earth's plants "convert light energy into chemical energy, which is used in the assimilation of atmospheric CO2 and the formation of sugars that fuel growth and yield," which phenomena make this natural and life-sustaining process, in their words, "a major target for improving crop productivity both via conventional breeding and biotechnology." Next to a plant's need for carbon dioxide comes its need for water, the availability of which, in the words of Parry and Hawkesford, "is the major constraint on world crop productivity." And they state that "since more than 80% of the [world's] available water is used for agricultural production, there is little opportunity to use additional water for crop production, especially because as populations increase, the demand to use water for other activities also increases." Hence, they rightly conclude that "a real and immediate challenge for agriculture is to increase crop production with less available water." Enlarging upon this challenge, they give an example of a *success story*: the Australian wheat variety 'Drysdale', which gained its fame "because it uses water more efficiently." This valued characteristic is achieved "by slightly restricting stomatal aperture and thereby the loss of water from the leaves." They note, however, that this ability "reduces photosynthetic performance slightly under ideal conditions," but they say it enables plants to "have access to water later in the growing season thereby increasing total photosynthesis over the life of the crop." Of course, Drysdale is but one variety of one crop; and the ideal goal would be to get nearly all varieties of all crops to use water more efficiently. And that goal can actually be reached by doing nothing, by merely halting the efforts of radical environmentalists to deny earth's carbon-based life forms -- that's all of us and the rest of the earth's plants and animals -- the extra carbon we and they need to live our lives to the fullest. This is because allowing the air's CO2content to rise in response to the burning of fossil fuels naturally causes the vast majority of earth's plants to progressively reduce the apertures of their stomata and thereby lower the rate at which water escapes through them to the air. And the result is even better than that produced by the breeding of Drysdale, because the extra CO2 in the airmore than overcomes the photosynthetic reduction that results from the partial closure of plant stomatal apertures, allowing even more yield to be produced per unit of water transpired in the process. Yet man can make the situation better still, by breeding and selecting crop varieties that perform better under higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations than the varieties we currently rely upon, or he can employ various technological means of altering them to do so. Truly, we can succeed, even where "the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of substantially reducing the world's hungry by 2015 will not be met," as Parry and Hawkesford accurately inform us. And this truly seems to us the moral thing to do, when "at least one billion people are chronically malnourished and the situation is deteriorating," with more people "hungrier now than at the start of the millennium."

### I-Law

**Ilaw fails --- states will either inevitably cooperate, or ilaw can’t convince them to**

Eric A. **Posner 9**, Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. The Perils of Global Legalism, 34-6

34 ¶ Most **global legalists** acknowledge that international law is created and enforced by states. They **believe that states are willing to expand international law** along legalistic lines **because states’ long-term interests lie in solving global collective action problems**. In the absence of a world govern- ment or other forms of integration, international law seems like the only way for states to solve these problems. **The great difﬁculty** for the global legalist **is explaining why, if states create** and maintain **international law**, **they will also not break it** **when they prefer to free ride. In the absence of an enforcement mechanism, what ensures that states** that create law and legal institutions that are supposed to solve global collective action prob- lems **will not ignore them?** ¶For the rational choice theorist, the answer is plain: **states cannot solve global collective action problems by creating institutions that themselves depend on global collective action.** **This is not to say that international law is not possible** at all. Certainly, states can cooperate by threatening to retaliate against cheaters, and where international problems are matters of coordination rather than conﬂ ict, international law can go far, indeed.7 **But if states** (or the individuals who control states) **cannot create a global government** or q uasi-g overnment institutions, **then it seems unlikely that they can solve,** in spontaneous fashion, **the types of problems that, at the national level, require the action of governments**. ¶ Global legalists are not enthusiasts for rational choice theory and have ¶ 35¶ grappled with this problem in other ways.8 I will criticize their attempts in chapter 3. Here I want to focus on **one approach**, which **is to in**

**sist that just as** **individuals can be loyal to government,** **so too can** individuals (and their **governments**) **be loyal to international law** and be willing to defer to its requirements even when self-i nterest does not strictly demand that they do so. **International law has force because (or to the extent that) it is legitimate**.9 ¶ What makes governance or law legitimate? This is a complicated ques- tion best left to philosophers, but a simple and adequate point for present purposes is that **no system of law will be perceived as legitimate unless those governed by that law believe that the law** does good — **serves their interests** or respects and enforces their values. Perhaps more is required than this — such as political participation, for example — but we can treat the ﬁ rst condition as necessary if not sufﬁ cient. **If individuals believe that a system of law does not advance their interests** and respect their values, **that** instead **it** **advances the interests of others or is dysfunctional** and helps no one at all, **they will not believe that the law is legitimate and will not voluntarily submit to its authority. ¶** Unfortunately, **international law does not satisfy this condition**, mainly **because of its institutional weaknesses**; but of course, **its institutional weaknesses stem from the state system — states are not willing to tolerate powerful international agencies. In classic international law, states enjoy sovereign equality, which means that international law cannot be created unless all agree**, and that international law binds all states equally. What this means is that if nearly everyone in the world agrees that some global legal instrument would be beneﬁ cial (**a climate treaty**, the UN charter), it **can be blocked by a tiny country** like Iceland (population 300,000) **or a dictatorship** like North Korea. **What is the attraction of a system that puts a tiny country like Iceland on equal footing with China?** When then at- torney general Robert Jackson tried to justify American aid for Britain at the onset of World War II on the grounds that the Nazi Germany was the aggressor, international lawyers complained that the United States could not claim neutrality while providing aid to a belligerent — there was no such thing as an aggressor in international law.10 Nazi Germany had not agreed to such a rule of international law; therefore, such a rule could not exist. Only through the destruction of Nazi Germany could international law be changed; East and West Germany could reenter international so-¶ 36¶ ciety only on other people’s terms. How could such a system be perceived to be legitimate? ¶ There is, of course, a reason why international law works in this fash- ion. **Because no world government can compel states to comply with inter- national law, states will comply with international law only when doing so is in their interest.** In this way, international law always depends on state consent. So international law must take states as they are, which means that little states, big states, good states, and bad states, all exist on a plane of equality. ¶

# 2NC

## Relations

#### More evidence – decades of cooling and industrial patterns prove

Ferrara, 12 (Peter Ferrara, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis. Served in the White House Office of Policy Development, and as Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States, Graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School; “Sorry Global Warming Alarmists, The Earth Is Cooling,” 5/23/2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/)

Climate change itself is already in the process of definitively rebutting climate alarmists who think human use of fossil fuels is causing ultimately catastrophic global warming. That is because natural climate cycles have already turned from warming to cooling, global temperatures have already been declining for more than 10 years, and global temperatures will continue to decline for another two decades or more. That is one of the most interesting conclusions to come out of the seventh International Climate Change Conference sponsored by the Heartland Institute, held last week in Chicago. I attended, and served as one of the speakers, talking about The Economic Implications of High Cost Energy. The conference featured serious natural science, contrary to the self-interested *political science* you hear from government financed global warming alarmists seeking to justify widely expanded regulatory and taxation powers for government bodies, or government body wannabees, such as the United Nations. See for yourself, as the conference speeches are online. What you will see are calm, dispassionate presentations by serious, pedigreed scientists discussing and explaining reams of data. In sharp contrast to these climate realists, the climate alarmists have long admitted that they cannot defend their theory that humans are causing catastrophic global warming in public debate. With the conference presentations online, let’s see if the alarmists really do have any response. The Heartland Institute has effectively become the international headquarters of the climate realists, an analog to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has achieved that status through these international climate conferences, and the publication of its *Climate Change Reconsidered* volumes, produced in conjunction with the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). Those *Climate Change Reconsidered* volumes are an equivalently thorough scientific rebuttal to the irregular Assessment Reports of the UN’s IPCC. You can ask any advocate of human caused catastrophic global warming what their response is to *Climate Change Reconsidered*. If they have none, they are not qualified to discuss the issue intelligently. Check out the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming (and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally caused climate cycles. For example, temperatures dropped steadily from the late 1940s to the late 1970s. The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due around now. In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late 1990s, a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage. The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures.

No impact and it’s not human-caused – consensus

Taylor 12 (James, Forbes energy and environment writer, 3/14/2012, "Shock Poll: Meteorologists Are Global Warming Skeptics", www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2012/03/14/shock-poll-meteorologists-are-global-warming-skeptics/)

A recent survey of American Meteorological Society members shows meteorologists are skeptical that humans are causing a global warming crisis. The survey confirms what many scientists have been reporting for years; the politically focused bureaucratic leadership of many science organizations is severely out of touch with the scientists themselves regarding global warming issues. According to American Meteorological Society (AMS) data, 89% of AMS meteorologists believe global warming is happening, but only a minority (30%) is very worried about global warming. This sharp contrast between the large majority of meteorologists who believe global warming is happening and the modest minority who are nevertheless very worried about it is consistent with other scientist surveys. This contrast exposes global warming alarmists who assert that 97% of the world’s scientists agree humans are causing a global warming crisis simply because these scientists believe global warming is occurring. However, as this and other scientist surveys show, believing that some warming is occurring is not the same as believing humans are causing a worrisome crisis. Other questions solidified the meteorologists’ skepticism about humans creating a global warming crisis. For example, among those meteorologists who believe global warming is happening, only a modest majority (59%) believe humans are the primary cause. More importantly, only 38% of respondents who believe global warming is occurring say it will be very harmful during the next 100 years. With substantially fewer than half of meteorologists very worried about global warming or expecting substantial harm during the next 100 years, one has to wonder why environmental activist groups are sowing the seeds of global warming panic. Does anyone really expect our economy to be powered 100 years from now by the same energy sources we use today? Why immediately, severely, and permanently punish our economy with costly global warming restrictions when technological advances and the free market will likely address any such global warming concerns much more efficiently, economically and effectively? In another line of survey questions, 53% of respondents believe there is conflict among AMS members regarding the topic of global warming. Only 33% believe there is no conflict. Another 15% were not sure. These results provide strong refutation to the assertion that “the debate is over.” Interestingly, only 26% of respondents said the conflict among AMS members is unproductive. Overall, the survey of AMS scientists paints a very different picture than the official AMS Information Statement on Climate Change. Drafted by the AMS bureaucracy, the Information Statement leaves readers with the impression that AMS meteorologists have few doubts about humans creating a global warming crisis. The Information Statement indicates quite strongly that humans are the primary driver of global temperatures and the consequences are and will continue to be quite severe. Compare the bureaucracy’s Information Statement with the survey results of the AMS scientists themselves. Scientists who have attended the Heartland Institute’s annual International Conference on Climate Change report the same disconnect throughout their various science organizations; only a minority of scientists believes humans are causing a global warming crisis, yet the non-scientist bureaucracies publish position statements that contradict what the scientists themselves believe. Few, if any, of these organizations actually poll their members before publishing a position statement. Within this context of few actual scientist surveys, the AMS survey results are very powerful.

Natural variability explains warming trends

Idso, director of envt science – Peabody Energy, PhD Geography – ASU, Idso, professor – Maricopa County Community College, and Idso, PhD botany – ASU, ‘12

(Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, “Northern Scandinavian Temperatures: It's a Whole New Ball Game,” CO2 Science Vol. 15, No. 30, July)

In a game-changing paper published in the online version of Nature Climate Change, Esper et al. (8 July 2012) provide convincing evidence that both the Medieval and Roman Warm Periods of 1000 and 2000 years ago, respectively, were warmer than the Current Warm Period has been to date, in spite of the fact that today's atmospheric CO2 concentration is some 40% greater than it was during those two earlier periods.

In setting the stage for their paradigm-altering work, the twelve researchers - hailing from Finland, Germany, Scotland and Switzerland - write that "solar insolation changes, resulting from long-term oscillations of orbital configurations (Milankovitch, 1941), are an important driver of Holocene climate," referencing the studies of Mayewski et al. (2004) and Wanner et al. (2008). In addition, they state that this forcing has been "substantial over the past 2000 years, up to four times as large as the 1.6 W/m2 net anthropogenic forcing since 1750," as suggested by the work of Berger and Loutre (1991). And on the basis of "numerous high-latitude proxy records," as they describe it, they note that "slow orbital changes have recently been shown to gradually force boreal summer temperature cooling over the common era," citing Kaufman et al. (2009).

Fast-forwarding to the present, Esper et al. describe how they developed "a 2000-year summer temperature reconstruction based on 587 high-precision maximum latewood density (MXD) series from northern Scandinavia," which feat was accomplished "over three years using living and subfossil pine (Pinus sylvestris) trees from 14 lakes and 3 lakeshore sites above 65°N, making it not only longer but also much better replicated than any existing MXD time series." Then, after calibrating the pine MXD series against regional June-July-August mean temperature over the period 1876-2006, they obtained their final summer temperature history for the period stretching from 138 BC to AD 2006, as depicted in the graph below.

As determined from the relationship depicted in the figure above, Esper et al. calculate a long-term cooling trend of -0.31 ± 0.03°C per thousand years, which cooling they say is "missing in published tree-ring proxy records" but is "in line with coupled general circulation models (Zorita et al., 2005; Fischer and Jungclaus, 2011)," which computational results portray, as they describe it: substantial summer cooling over the past two millennia in northern boreal and Arctic latitudes.

"These findings," as the European researchers continue, "together with the missing orbital signature in published dendrochronological records, suggest that large-scale near-surface air temperature reconstructions (Mann et al., 1999; Esper et al., 2002; Frank et al., 2007; Hegerl et al., 2007; Mann et al., 2008) relying on tree-ring data may underestimate pre-instrumental temperatures including warmth during Medieval and Roman times," although they suggest that the impacts of the omitted long-term trend in basic tree-ring data may "diminish towards lower Northern Hemisphere latitudes, as the forcing and radiative feedbacks decrease towards equatorial regions."

And so it is that the question for our day ought to be: Why was much of the CO2-starved world of Medieval and Roman times decidedly warmer (by about 0.3 and 0.5°C, respectively) than it was during the peak warmth of the 20th century? Clearly, the greenhouse effect of atmospheric CO2 - if it has not been grossly over-estimated - must currently be being significantly tempered by some unappreciated CO2- and/or warming-induced negative-feedback phenomenon (possibly of biological origin) to the degree that the basic greenhouse effect of earth's rising atmospheric CO2 concentration cannot fully compensate for the decrease in solar insolation experienced over the past two millennia as a result of the "long-term oscillations of orbital configurations" cited by Esper et al. (2012).

Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

## I-Law

**No escalation**

Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, ‘7

(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely.Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

**Empirics are conclusive – tons of war in the region and zero escalation**

Kevin Drum, Staff Writer for the Washington Monthly, 9/9/’7

(<http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012029.php>)

Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.

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## PTX

#### Default means the plan would be delayed or under-funded – fiat only means the plan passes

Goldfarb 1-1 [Zachary A. Goldfarb 1-1-2013 Washington Post “‘Fiscal cliff’ deal does little to tame threats from debt ceiling, high unemployment rates” http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/fiscal-cliff/fiscal-cliff-deal-does-little-to-tame-threats-from-debt-ceiling-high-unemployment-rates/2013/01/01/8e4c14aa-5393-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f\_story.html]

Leaving the fate of the debt ceiling up in the air will cause anxiety among businesses and individuals, potentially crimping hiring, investing and consumer spending.¶ In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation’s bills and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shaking world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.¶ And while a default would be all but certain to push the economy into recession, growth is likely to be slow — and job-market improvement slight — even without such a cataclysmic event. The unemployment rate, which stands at 7.7 percent, is not expected to fall below 7.4 percent by the end of this year, and not below 6 percent until at least 2016 or later.

**Progress is continuing due to Obama’s push**

**Davis and Jackson, 10/10**

Susan Davis and David Jackson; “Obama, Republicans engage talks on debt and spending,” 10/10/2013, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/10/house-gop-debt-limit-six-weeks/2957931> //bghs-ms

WASHINGTON — **A late Thursday meeting between President Obama and congressional Republicans showed the first sign of progress towards ending the government shutdown and averting the first-ever U.S. default**.¶ **No deal was secured, but both the president and top Republicans said they instructed aides to continue talks to find common ground**. "The president didn't say yes, didn't say no. **We're continuing to negotiate this evening," said House Budget Chairman Paul Ryan**, R-Wis., who attended the meeting. Majority Leader Eric **Cantor**, R-Va., **characterized the meeting as "useful" and said negotiations were continuing**.¶ **"The president looks forward to making continued progress with members on both sides of the aisle," the White House said in a statement. "The president's goal remains to ensure we pay the bills we've incurred, reopen the government and get back to the business of growing the economy, creating jobs and strengthening the middle class."**¶ House Republicans presented Obama with a proposal for a six-week increase in the nation's $16.7 trillion debt ceiling to head off an impending Oct. 17 default deadline. The White House had indicated earlier Thursday that Obama might be able to accept a short-term debt-limit extension, but **the president made it clear to GOP lawmakers that he also wants a plan to end the shutdown**, which began Oct. 1.¶ House Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers, R-Ky., said **the president is seeking more progress on a stopgap spending bill as part of the debt-limit negotiations**. "I think it's clear that he would like to have the shutdown stopped and that would require a (continuing resolution) and we're trying to find out what it is he would insist upon in a CR and what we would insist upon in a CR," Rogers said.

**Recent negotiations and Republican concessions prove a deal is imminent**

**LA Times, 10/10**

" Boehner says GOP will agree to debt ceiling extension,” 10/10/2013, <http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-pn-boehner-gop-agree-debt-ceiling-shutdown-20131010,0,3927178.story> //bghs-ms

WASHINGTON -- **The standoff over the federal budget moved toward at least a temporary end as** Speaker John A. **Boehner announced** Thursday that **House Republicans would agree to a six-week extension of the federal government’s ability to borrow to pay its bills, setting up late-night negotiations between the White House and Congress**.¶ In announcing his plan, Boehner said **Republicans no longer would insist on any policy changes in return for allowing the government to continue borrowing**. But he did not agree to reopen government programs that shut down last week

**Obama is winning because he’s controlling the message through a consistent focus**

**Diermeier, 10/4/13 -** IBM Distinguished Professor of Regulation and Competitive Practices at Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management; he also holds appointments in law and political science and directs Kellogg's Ford Motors Center for Global Citizenship (Daniel, “How a game theorist would solve the shutdown showdown” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/04/how-a-game-theorist-would-solve-the-shutdown-showdown/>)

So looking at confrontations like the current one on the shutdown, and the coming one on the debt ceiling, one analogy I've heard people use is the game of chicken, where two cars are driving at each other and the first one to swerve away loses. Swerving is worse for you than not swerving, but if nobody swerves then you die. Similarly, John Boehner doesn't want to "swerve" (pass a clean continuing resolution or debt ceiling increase) and Obama doesn't want to "swerve" (sign a CR that defunds Obamacare, or sign a non-clean debt ceiling increase), but if neither swerves, then the shutdown continues and/or **we default**. Is that a fair analogy?

That's the most basic way to think about it. When we think about the Cuban missile crisis, it kind of has that flavor. You could also call it a war of attrition, which is a more dynamic version of that. Those are appropriate analogies to a certain extent, but what they're missing is the specific nature of the U.S. political system and how public opinion plays a critical role in how damaging it is to be intransigent. It's not helpful for understanding the structural reasons why this is happening.

**The really critical question is whether the Republicans are going to stay together**. There's a spectrum, of course, depending on your district and what your primaries will look like, from more extreme to more moderate, but they've been more able to maintain a level of party discipline that's unusual compared to the '60s, '70s and '80s. But at what point **will the moderate Republicans peel off?** **Will they stay together, or will they feel so much backlash in their districts at this point**, and hear from their constituencies, **that the political calculus just doesn't work anymore?** That, to me, is the big question.

To a large extent **that will depend on how effective** the **Obama** administration **is in shifting public opinion.** It depends on (a) how catastrophic they think breaching the debt ceiling is and (b) who they're blaming for that. So I think **this bargaining game will be determined by how successful the two sides are in shifting public opinion**.

Who do you think is doing better at managing that so far?

**So far it's going better for** the **Obama** administration. You have these incidents of people being unable to get into national parks or Arlington National Cemetery, the Army/Navy games jeopardized. There are things where people say, "Ooh this is very bad," or "This is crazy." These are important because they give salience to the issue. The sequester didn't have anything like that. There wasn't anything symbolic that really caught people's attention and gave a sense of, "This is really wrong. We need to stop this." These small things, though they're economically not very significant, can shift public opinion because they reinforce how serious this is.

**Capital is key to that effort – capital’s not just about bargaining – it’s about focus – the plan’s expenditure of capital prevents Obama from maintaining a consistent message on the debt ceiling – it means he’ll lose the ability to ask for favors**

**Moore, 9/10/13 -** Guardian's US finance and economics editor.(Heidi, “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester>)

**The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time.** These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short. The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding. Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon. The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem. These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria. More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas. The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect. This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria. Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad. Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told: Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure. Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington. **Political capital** **– the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience** – **is a finite resource** in Washington. **Pursuing misguided policies takes** up **time**, **but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor.** It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason **the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time**.

**Political capital is finite and drives decisionmaking**

**Schier 9,** Professor of Poliitcal Science at Carleton, (Steven, "Understanding the Obama Presidency," The Forum: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Berkely Electronic Press, http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol7/iss1/art10)

In additional to formal powers, a president’s informal power is situationally derived and highly variable. Informal power is a function of the “political capital” presidents amass and deplete as they operate in office. Paul Light defines several components of political capital: party support of the president in Congress, public approval of the presidential conduct of his job, the President’s electoral margin and patronage appointments (Light 1983, 15). Richard Neustadt’s concept of a president’s “professional reputation” likewise figures into his political capital. Neustadt defines this as the “impressions in the Washington community about the skill and will with which he puts [his formal powers] to use” (Neustadt 1990, 185). In the wake of 9/11, George W. Bush’s political capital surged, and both the public and Washington elites granted him a broad ability to prosecute the war on terror. By the later stages of Bush’s troubled second term, beset by a lengthy and unpopular occupation of Iraq and an aggressive Democratic Congress, he found that his political capital had shrunk. Obama’s informal powers will prove variable, not stable, as is always the case for presidents. Nevertheless, he entered office with a formidable store of political capital. His solid electoral victory means he initially will receive high public support and strong backing from fellow Congressional partisans, a combination that will allow him much leeway in his presidential appointments and with his policy agenda. Obama probably enjoys the prospect of a happier honeymoon during his first year than did George W. Bush, who entered office amidst continuing controversy over the 2000 election outcome. Presidents usually employ power to disrupt the political order they inherit in order to reshape it according to their own agendas. Stephen Skowronek argues that “presidents disrupt systems, reshape political landscapes, and pass to successors leadership challenges that are different from the ones just faced” (Skowronek 1997, 6). Given their limited time in office and the hostile political alignments often present in Washington policymaking networks and among the electorate, presidents must force political change if they are to enact their agendas. In recent decades, Washington power structures have become more entrenched and elaborate (Drucker 1995) while presidential powers – through increased use of executive orders and legislative delegation (Howell 2003) –have also grown. The presidency has more powers in the early 21st century but also faces more entrenched coalitions of interests, lawmakers, and bureaucrats whose agendas often differ from that of the president. This is an invitation for an energetic president – and that seems to describe Barack Obama – to engage in major ongoing battles to impose his preferences.

**Their ideology arguments are false – politicians are pragmatic and will vote-swap**

Jon **Bond**, Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M University, **AND**, Richard **Fleisher**, Professor of Political Science @ Fordham University. **1990**. *The President in the Legislative Arena*. Pg. 22-23

While political values shared between the president and members of Con­gress provide an important linkage source, the effects of ideology are limited for several reasons. First, most members of Congress are pragmatic poli­ticians who do not have views and preferences at the extremes of a liberal-conservative continuum. Because the typical American voter is not strongly ideological, most representatives’ electoral self-interest is probably best served by avoiding ideological extremes. As noted above, ideology is a less impor­tant voting cue for moderates than it is for ideological extremists (Kingdon 1981, 268). Second, many votes that may be important to the president do not involve ideological issues. Distributive or “porkbarrel” programs, for example, typi­cally do not produce ideological divisions. Even conservatives who want to cut domestic spending and liberals who want to reduce defense spending work to protect domestic and defense programs in their districts. Presidents who attempt to tamper with these programs are likely to find few friends in Con­gress, as President Carter discovered when he opposed several water projects in 1977, and as President Reagan discovered when he vetoed the highway bill in 1987. Finally, ideological voting blocs are relatively informal coalitions com­posed of individuals who have similar values. The “conservative coalition” of Republicans and southern Democrats, for example, appears on certain votes and sometimes has a significant influence on the outcome of floor votes (Shelley 1983; Brady and Bullock 1980; Manley 1973). But this coalition of conservatives has no formal organization with elected leaders to serve as a communication and information center. Although there are several ideologi­cally based caucuses in Congress, these organizations are less institutional­ized than are parties, and their leaders do not command the same status and respect as do party leaders. Without an integrated institutional structure and respected leadership, ideological coalition formation remains relatively ad hoc.

#### Winners lose for Obama

Jackie Calmes, NYTimes, 11/12/12, In Debt Talks, Obama Is Ready to Go Beyond Beltway, mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/politics/legacy-at-stake-obama-plans-broader-push-for-budget-deal.xml

That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies - in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney. George C. Edwards III, a leading scholar of the presidency at Texas A & M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama's presidency is titled "Overreach," said, "He didn't understand the limits of what he could do." "They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we'd build this advancing-tide theory of legislation," Mr. Edwards said. "And that was very naïve, very silly. Well, they've learned a lot, I think." "Effective leaders," he added, "exploit opportunities rather than create them." The budget showdown is an opportunity. But like many, it holds risks as well as potential rewards. "This election is the second chance to be what he promised in 2008, and that is to break the gridlock in Washington," said Kenneth M. Duberstein, a Reagan White House chief of staff, who voted for Mr. Obama in 2008 and later expressed disappointment. "But it seems like this is a replay of 2009 and 2010, when he had huge majorities in the House and Senate, rather than recognizing that 'we've got to figure out ways to work together and it's not just what I want.' " For now, at least, Republican lawmakers say they may be open to raising the tax bill for some earners. "We can increase revenue without increasing the tax rates on anybody in this country," said Representative Tom Price, Republican of Georgia and a leader of House conservatives, on "Fox News Sunday." "We can lower the rates, broaden the base, close the loopholes." The challenge for Mr. Obama is to use his postelection leverage to persuade Republicans - or to help Speaker John A. Boehner persuade Republicans - that a tax compromise is in their party's political interest since most Americans favor compromise and higher taxes on the wealthy to reduce annual deficits. Some of the business leaders the president will meet with on Wednesday are members of the new Fix the Debt coalition, which has raised about $40 million to urge lawmakers and their constituents to support a plan that combines spending cuts with new revenue. That session will follow Mr. Obama's meeting with labor leaders on Tuesday. His first trip outside Washington to engage the public will come after Thanksgiving, since Mr. Obama is scheduled to leave next weekend on a diplomatic trip to Asia. Travel plans are still sketchy, partly because his December calendar is full of the traditional holiday parties. Democrats said the White House's strategy of focusing both inside and outside of Washington was smart. "You want to avoid getting sucked into the Beltway inside-baseball games," said Joel Johnson, a former adviser in the Clinton White House and the Senate. "You can still work toward solutions, but make sure you get out of Washington while you are doing that." The president must use his leverage soon, some Democrats added, because it could quickly wane as Republicans look to the 2014 midterm elections, when the opposition typically takes seats from the president's party in Congress.